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CITIZENSHIP AND PROTECTION
Andrew Kent*
This Article discusses the role of U.S. citizenship in determining who
would be protected by the Constitution, other domestic laws, and the courts.
Traditionally, within the United States, both noncitizens and citizens have
had more or less equal civil liberties protections. But outside the sovereign
territory of the United States, noncitizens have historically lacked such
protections. This Article sketches the traditional rules that demarcated the
boundaries of protection, then addresses the functional and normative
justifications for the very different treatment of noncitizens depending on
whether or not they were present within the United States.
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INTRODUCTION
Chief Justice Earl Warren famously described citizenship as “man’s basic
right” because “it is nothing less than the right to have rights.”1 As Justice
Robert Jackson put it for the full Court, “Citizenship as a head of
jurisdiction and a ground of protection was old when Paul invoked it in his
appeal to Caesar. The years have not destroyed nor diminished the
importance of citizenship nor have they sapped the vitality of a citizen’s

* Professor, Fordham University School of Law; Faculty Advisor, Center on National
Security at Fordham Law. Thanks to all of the terrific participants in our September 2013
Symposium on Citizenship, Immigration, and National Security After 9/11 put on by the
Center on National Security and the Fordham Law Review. My thinking about the topics
addressed in this paper benefitted greatly from their contributions. Thanks also to Karen
Greenberg, Joe Landau, and Ethan Leib for helpful comments on an early draft.
1. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
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claims upon his government for protection.”2 U.S. citizenship—the topic of
this Symposium—is thus theorized to be the foundation upon which all
other rights rest and the ultimate basis upon which to claim protection
against the U.S. government.
But the actual connection over the course of American history between
citizenship, the Constitution, and protection from government overreach has
been much more muddled and complex than this. In ordinary peacetime
contexts, citizenship has historically played a relatively minor role in
demarcating the Constitution’s domain—that is, in determining who is
under the umbrella of its civil liberties protections. Most political rights
have always been reserved for citizens.3 And in the immigration context, of
course, citizenship can be crucial. But with regard to civil liberties, the
practice of U.S. constitutionalism has been to make relatively few
distinctions based on citizenship within the United States and during
peacetime.4
Instead of citizenship, the primary axes along which the domain of the
Constitution’s protections has been demarcated are territorial location,
domicile, and enemy status during wartime. For much of American history,
constitutional protections stopped at the boundaries of the United States and
did not extend to military enemies or persons in war zones, no matter their
citizenship. The right to access the courts to claim legal protections, which
often is as important as having substantive constitutional rights themselves,
was also dependent on enemy status and territorial location more than on
citizenship.
In Part I, this Article summarizes the historical evidence about the role of
enemy status, territorial location, domicile, and, to a lesser extent,
citizenship in determining who was protected by the Constitution and could
access U.S. courts. I also set out the most prominent typologies and
theories that legal academics have used to describe the rules setting the

2. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 (1950); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1, 7 (1957) (plurality opinion) (“When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who
is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to
protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in
another land. This is not a novel concept. To the contrary, it is as old as government. It was
recognized long before Paul successfully invoked his right as a Roman citizen to be tried in
strict accordance with Roman law. And many centuries later an English historian wrote: ‘In
a Settled Colony the inhabitants have all the rights of Englishmen. They take with them, in
the first place, that which no Englishman can by expatriation put off, namely, allegiance to
the Crown, the duty of obedience to the lawful commands of the Sovereign, and obedience
to the Laws which Parliament may think proper to make with reference to such a Colony.
But, on the other hand, they take with them all the rights and liberties of British Subjects; all
the rights and liberties as against the Prerogative of the Crown, which they would enjoy in
this country.’” (quoting 2 CHARLES M. CLODE, THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE CROWN 175
(London, John Murray 1869)).
3. See Peter J. Spiro, The (Dwindling) Rights and Obligations of Citizenship, 21 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 899 (2013).
4. See infra Part I. See generally Alexander M. Bickel, Citizenship in the American
Constitution, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 369 (1973) (“[T]he concept of citizenship plays only the
most minimal role in the American constitutional scheme.”).
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boundaries of constitutional protection and contrast them with the actual
historical concepts and practices used in earlier eras.
Part II explores the justifications for these traditional limits on the
domain of the Constitution’s protections by addressing two questions:
First, why have both citizens and noncitizens generally been protected by
the Constitution and courts while in the United States? Second, why have
protections ceased—entirely for noncitizens and to a lesser extent for
citizens—when they are outside the sovereign territory of the United States
or when they are military enemies? Having explored the reasons why
noncitizens have historically received robust protections while within the
United States, this Article suggests that some additional protections for
noncitizens present in the United States might be warranted. In particular, I
suggest that there should be a rebuttable presumption that noncitizens in the
United States during peacetime have equivalent constitutional protections to
citizens. The lack of extraterritorial constitutional rights for noncitizens and
for military enemies has been subjected to sustained criticism in recent
decades. This Article acknowledges those criticisms, but suggests that
there are some reasonable justifications for limiting constitutional
protection to the traditional domains.
Before proceeding, I want to note the limits of this discussion, which is
focused on the national security and foreign affairs context. Over the
course of American history, women, slaves, African Americans including
freed slaves, suspects and defendants in state and local criminal cases,
incarcerated convicts, the institutionalized mentally ill, and other groups
have moved from largely or entirely outside the domain of the
Constitution’s and the courts’ protections to their current position inside.5
Indeed, in many ways, the enlargement of the domain of protection has
been the most important part of the story of U.S. constitutional
development. Here I am talking instead about contexts involving national
security and foreign affairs. Thus, when I say that enemy status, territorial
location, domicile, and, to a lesser extent, citizenship determined the
domain of the constitutional protections, I do not mean to slight the
importance of race, gender, and other categories. Those topics are critically
important, but are not mine in this Article.

5. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”), with Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857) (stating that “at the time of the Declaration of
Independence, and when the Constitution of the United States was framed and adopted”
persons of African descent “had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of
an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or
political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound
to respect”).
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I. THE HISTORICAL DOMAIN OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE RIGHT TO ACCESS THE COURTS
This Part summarizes the traditional categorical rules about the domain
of protection. I am generalizing a great deal here because the supporting
research is presented in detail in other places and, in any event, this Article
is focused on big themes that span U.S. history rather than doctrinal nuance
at a given point in time.
Territorial location and domicile, more than citizenship, has historically
been a crucial determinant of protection by the Constitution and the courts.
Generally speaking, both citizens and noncitizens within the United States
were protected by the Constitution and could access the courts to claim
protection. Even if it had been deemed desirable, it would have been
difficult to assign rights to persons within U.S. territory on the basis of
citizenship, for there was no formal definition of U.S. citizenship in federal
positive law until the Civil Rights Act of 1866.6 It was widely assumed that
birth within the United States—at least for white people—conferred
citizenship, but neither the Constitution nor congressional statute spelled
out the particulars about what national citizenship was, what relation it had
to state citizenship, or, with the exception of naturalization (which was
provided by statute), how national citizenship was gained.7 There was
some debate about whether resident noncitizens had civil rights under the
Constitution in the first decade under the new Constitution, but the issue
was fairly quickly settled in favor of rights for all within the United States.8
Congress did impose tougher naturalization requirements during this time,9
but in terms of civil rights, there emerged a clear consensus that resident
noncitizens possessed them.
A significant amount of subsequent U.S. Supreme Court doctrine
establishes the constitutional rights of noncitizens present in the United
States.10 Immigration case law also shows the importance of territorial

6. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (“[A]ll persons born in the
United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby
declared to be citizens of the United States . . . .”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 1608–1870, at
231–36, 287–88 (1978).
8. See J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution,
95 GEO. L.J. 463, 527–31 (2007) (discussing debates about the Alien Friends and Alien
Enemies Acts); see also GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 103 (1996)
(“The legacy of the Alien Act debates includes the fundamental rejection of the claim that
citizenship is the key to rights-bearing capacity under the Constitution.”).
9. KETTNER, supra note 7, at 239–44.
10. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211–12 (1982) (illegal aliens under the Equal
Protection Clause); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (resident aliens
under the Fifth Amendment); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (resident aliens
under the First Amendment); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489
(1931) (foreign corporation with property in the United States under the Takings Clause);
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915) (resident aliens under the Equal Protection Clause);
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (resident aliens under the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368–69 (1886) (resident aliens
under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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location. As the Court said recently, “The distinction between an alien who
has effected an entry into the United States and one who has never entered
runs throughout immigration law.”11 Noncitizens who have entered the
United States had significantly greater constitutional rights in immigration
contexts than those stopped at the border.
Before the twenty-first century, noncitizens outside the sovereign
territory of the United States were held to lack any constitutional rights.12
Although these mistaken claims are heard less frequently than they once
were,13 some scholars still continue to assert that, during earlier eras of
American history, noncitizens outside the United States were understood to
possess constitutional rights,14 including protections under the Suspension
Clause.15 This is incorrect. Certainly no Supreme Court case prior to the
11. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (citing Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228,
230 (1925)); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (stating that in the
immigration area, “Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to
citizens” (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976))).
12. See Kent, supra note 8, passim; Andrew Kent, Boumediene, Munaf, and the
Supreme Court’s Misreading of the Insular Cases, 97 IOWA L. REV. 101, 123–32 (2011)
[hereinafter Kent, Insular Cases]; Andrew Kent, Do Boumediene Rights Expire?, 161 U. PA.
L. REV. PENNUMBRA 20, 23–24 (2012); Andrew Kent, Habeas Corpus, Protection, and
Extraterritorial Constitutional Rights: A Reply to Stephen Vladeck’s “Insular Thinking
About Habeas,” 97 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 34, 34, 36–40 (2012); Andrew Kent, The
Constitution and the Laws of War During the Civil War, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839,
1853–60 (2010) [hereinafter Kent, Civil War].
13. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
99–100 (1990) (suggesting that the Framers intended the Bill of Rights to embody a
“universal human rights ideology” that would protect noncitizens abroad).
14. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Boumediene and Fundamental Principles of Constitutional
Power, 21 REGENT U. L. REV. 351, 354–55 (2009) (implying that the Founders believed that
noncitizens outside the United States had constitutional rights). Recently, Professor Jules
Lobel suggested that prize decisions arising from the Quasi-War with France “implicitly
recognize[d] and accept[ed] the extraterritorial application of the Constitution’s separationof-powers provisions.” Jules Lobel, Separation of Powers, Individual Rights, and the
Constitution Abroad, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1629, 1635 (2013) (citing Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 170 (1804); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28–29 (1801)). But, by implicit
direction from the Constitution and Congress that longstanding customary practices of
admiralty courts would continue under the new constitutional system, federal courts sitting
in prize applied the law of nations to decide the legality of U.S. prize seizures, absent
contrary direction by statute. Imprimatur of a prize court was required to legalize the seizure
and clear away all competing claims to title so the vessel and cargo could be sold by the
captors or payment for salvage recovered, as the case may be. Barreme and Seeman do not
show that the Constitution operated extraterritorially to grant enforceable constitutional
rights to noncitizens, but rather that federal courts followed their instructions to refuse to
approve seizures by U.S. officials or agents if the seizures violated the law of nations or
statute.
15. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Suspension Clause As a Structural Right, 62 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 275, 293 (2008) (discussing In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), as an
example of the “extraterritorial” or “overseas” availability of habeas for noncitizens over the
executive’s objections). Yamashita, however, arose in the Philippines and was decided when
the Philippines was actually still American territory (independence came in July 1946, after
the Supreme Court’s decision). In addition, the Supreme Court’s power to review Mr.
Yamashita’s habeas petition by certiorari came from a statute expressly granting such power,
28 U.S.C. § 349 (1940), and the Philippine courts had power given by positive law to issue
writs of habeas corpus. Because both habeas corpus in the local courts and appellate review
in an Article III court were provided by statute, the Suspension Clause was not implicated.
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twenty-first century ever held or suggested that noncitizens outside the
sovereign territory of the United States had constitutional rights.16 I have
exhaustively researched this issue, digging into reported and unreported
case law, executive and congressional documents, legal treatises,
newspapers, and popular writings during several periods of American
history including the Founding, the Civil War era, and the era of
imperialism around the turn of the twentieth century. I have found no
evidence that noncitizens outside the United States were understood to have
constitutional protections, and a very large number of sources that reject
that idea.17
Whether U.S. citizens possess extraterritorial constitutional rights is a
complicated question. Since the mid-twentieth century, it has been
generally thought that they do.18 But there is much confusion about the law
prior to that time. There are several Supreme Court decisions holding or
16. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770 (2008) (“[B]efore today the Court has
never held that noncitizens detained by our Government in territory over which another
country maintains de jure sovereignty have any rights under our Constitution.”); cf.
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (“It is well established that certain constitutional protections
available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our
geographic borders.”).
17. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950) (“[A]t least since 1886,
we have extended to the person and property of resident aliens important constitutional
guaranties—such as due process of law of the Fourteenth Amendment. But, in extending
constitutional protections beyond the citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point out that it
was the alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary power to
act.” (citation omitted)); id. at 784 (rejecting a plea for “extraterritorial application” of the
Bill of Rights to protect enemy aliens outside the United States and stating that “[n]o
decision of this Court supports such a view. None of the learned commentators on our
Constitution has ever hinted at it” (citation omitted)); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324, 332 (1937) (“[O]ur Constitution, laws, and policies have no extraterritorial operation,
unless in respect to our own citizens.”); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 318 (1936) (“Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any
force in foreign territory unless in respect of our citizens . . . .”); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893) (“Chinese laborers, therefore, like all other aliens residing
in the United States for a shorter or longer time, are entitled, so long as they are permitted by
the government of the United States to remain in the country, to the safeguards of the
constitution, and to the protection of the laws, in regard to their rights of person and of
property, and to their civil and criminal responsibility.”); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464
(1891) (“By the constitution a government is ordained and established ‘for the United States
of America,’ and not for countries outside of their limits. The guaranties it affords . . . apply
only to citizens and others within the United States, or who are brought there for trial for
alleged offenses committed elsewhere, and not to residents or temporary soujourners abroad.
The constitution can have no operation in another country.” (citation omitted)); Norris v.
Doniphan, 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 385, 399 (1863) (“The restrictions in the constitution upon the
powers of the government were designed to protect the people of the United States, and not
aliens resident abroad.”); 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 1042 (1819) (statement of Rep. Henry
Baldwin, later a justice of the Supreme Court) (referring to British subjects executed by
General Andrew Jackson during a U.S. military raid into Spanish-owned Florida and
rejecting the claim that “the Constitution and laws of the country” had been violated because
“neither have any bearing on the case of these men. They were found and executed outside
of the territorial limits of the United States, where our laws or Constitution have no
operation, except as between us and our own citizens, and where none other could claim
their benefit and protection.”).
18. See generally Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality opinion).
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suggesting that U.S. citizens or U.S. nationals lacked extraterritorial
constitutional rights,19 but there are indications that U.S. citizenship or
lawful permanent residence might have provided some extraterritorial rights
protection.20 Most of the controversial and coercive national security
activities of the U.S. government occurring outside the United States
impacted only noncitizens, and, hence, prior to the mid-twentieth century,
no definitive doctrine about the extraterritorial rights of citizens was needed
or developed.
Professor Linda Bosniak has called this geographic or territorial approach
to allocating rights the “hard-on-the-outside, soft-on-the-inside” method.21
In earlier centuries, this general approach to determining the domain of
rights was described as a reciprocal relationship between allegiance and
protection.22 Those who owed and gave allegiance—all citizens and any
noncitizens who were peacefully resident or traveling within the United
States—were generally within the protection of the domestic laws, courts,
and government of the United States. Persons who owed no allegiance,
such as noncitizens abroad, also received no protection.

19. See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464, 480 (1891) (sailor of U.S.-flagged vessel tried in
a U.S. consular court in Japan); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901) (U.S. citizen
extradited to Cuba governed by U.S. military law for a criminal trial). For a discussion of
Neely and its significance, see Kent, Insular Cases, supra note 12, at 145–49.
20. See Kent, supra note 8, at 494–97 (providing a number of examples). Professor
Gerald Neuman disagrees that extraterritorial constitutional rights for U.S. citizens were
thinkable before the mid-twentieth century, and, in particular, disagrees with my
characterization of Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851), involving a tort suit
by a U.S. citizen against a U.S. army officer for events occurring in Mexico. See Gerald
Neuman, Understanding Global Due Process, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 367 n.7 (2009)
(alleging that I misunderstood and “selectively” quoted Harmony ). As I noted previously,
Harmony is, in form, a common law trespass suit. See Kent, supra note 8, at 495. But the
plaintiff’s counsel quite clearly and, in a more indirect fashion, the Supreme Court, also
referenced federal constitutional rights among other rules of law to help describe the nature
of the citizen’s right that was violated in Mexico. See Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 126–
27, 134, 136. The nineteenth century witnessed a very gradual shift from the common law
and law of nations to constitutional law as the primary law governing civil rights suits
against federal officers. See Andrew Kent, Are Damages Different: Bivens and National
Security, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 42–44), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2330476.
Harmony was an early
transitional decision along this road. The Supreme Court soon described Harmony as a
constitutional decision, see Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225, 234 (1876), as did the Court
and D.C. Circuit in the twentieth century. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 8 (Black, J.) (plurality
opinion); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 626–27 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Harmony was not, at
bottom, a constitutional decision, as it would be if it arose today, but neither was it a pure
common law tort suit with no constitutional dimensions, as Neuman incorrectly suggests.
Harmony supports my modest claim that, contra Neuman and some other scholars,
extraterritorial constitutional rights for U.S. citizens were “thinkable” prior to the midtwentieth century. See Kent, supra note 8, at 497.
21. Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of Immigrants, 8
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 389, 396 (2007).
22. This paragraph is based on Andrew Kent, Judicial Review for Enemy Fighters: The
Court’s Fateful Turn in Ex parte Quirin, the Nazi Saboteur Case, 66 VAND. L. REV. 153,
176–211 (2013). See also Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823
passim (2009).
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Wartime was also a fault line for protection by the Constitution and
courts. Both U.S. citizens and aliens on the home front remained protected
by constitutional and other domestic law rights during war, but all persons
resident in an enemy nation, enrolled in an enemy’s armed forces (enemy
fighters), or present at the site of actual combat were out of the protection of
the Constitution, no matter their citizenship.23 The Civil War was
responsible for solidifying these rules in U.S. law. The residents of the
Confederate States of America (CSA) were U.S. citizens or resident
noncitizens who, under some earlier understandings, retained common law
and constitutional rights even during wartime that would have prevented the
U.S. government from using military measures against them.24 During the
war, the Supreme Court accepted the Union’s legal view that residents of
the CSA had forfeited constitutional rights by their rebellion and attempted
secession, and could be treated for most purposes as de facto nonresident
enemy aliens, a class that lacked protection by the Constitution.25
Prior to the twentieth century, the common law and international law
were invoked as frequently, or even more so, than the U.S. Constitution to
provide protections against the U.S. government. Therefore, questions of
the domain of protection and how it has changed over time cannot only
examine entitlement to constitutional protection. Because common law and
international law often functioned as effective substitutes for constitutional
protection, it should not be surprising that the availability of those
protections also depended on war, territorial location, domicile, and
citizenship. Access to protection under common law or international law
was controlled both procedurally and substantively—by both procedural or
standing doctrines about who could access the courts to seek legal
protection and substantive doctrines about the scope of rights. Civilian
enemy aliens (nationals of a country at war with the United States)
domiciled abroad did not have the right to access U.S. courts during
wartime.26 Residents of the CSA—most of whom were U.S. citizens—
were barred from the Union’s courts during the Civil War as de facto
enemy aliens.27 Enemy fighters, no matter their nationality, domicile, or
actual location, could not access U.S. courts during wartime.28 Even U.S.
citizens domiciled in an enemy nation during wartime lacked the right to
access U.S. courts. Moreover, it was generally held that “[l]east of all, will
the common law undertake to rejudge acts done flagrante bello in the face

23. See Kent, Civil War, supra note 12, passim; Kent, supra note 22, passim. On the
legal effect of residence in an enemy nation during wartime, see KETTNER, supra note 7, at
277–78.
24. See Kent, Civil War, supra note 12, at 1860–71.
25. Id. at 1872–1902.
26. This and the following two sentences are based on Kent, supra note 22, at 176–211.
27. See Kent, Civil War, supra note 12, at 1905–07.
28. Kent, supra note 22, at 188–215.
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of the enemy.”29 So the site of actual battle was not generally a zone where
the common law provided protections.
In sum, under traditional domain rules, noncitizens located outside the
United States, military enemies wherever located (no matter their
citizenship), and all persons at a site of active combat were outside the
protection of the Constitution. The right to access U.S. courts to claim
protection by the Constitution or other laws was denied to military enemies
and to nonresident enemy aliens. The domain of protection was therefore
based on formal, categorical distinctions between domestic and foreign
territory, war and peace, resident and nonresident, enemy fighter and not,
and zone of battle and elsewhere. Citizen-noncitizen distinctions mattered,
but less than is commonly supposed.
Starting with the pathbreaking work of Professor Gerald Neuman, legal
academics have created various typologies to describe the theories of the
domain of the Constitution.
Their terminology varies—different
approaches are variously called membership, compact, social contract,
territoriality, country, mutuality of obligation, municipal law, organic,
global due process, functional, limited government, universalism, and
conscience.30 I have not adopted any of these typologies, which often mix
the descriptive and normative—the lex lata and lex ferenda, as international
lawyers would say, law as it is (or was) and law as one would prefer it to
be. I have instead, for my descriptive purposes, decided to stick close to the
language and concepts used during earlier eras of our constitutional history
by courts, executive officials, litigants, theorists, and other actors. That
approach allows us to see more clearly how enemy status, domicile,
territorial location, and citizenship interacted to demarcate the domain of
the Constitution and the right to access the courts. In particular, I prefer the
language of “protection” and “allegiance” because it was widely used well
into the twentieth century.31
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE TRADITIONAL DOMAIN RULES
What might justify the “hard-on-the-outside, soft-on-the-inside”
approach, under which both citizens and noncitizens in the United States
during peacetime are granted broad and broadly similar protections under

29. Tyler v. Pomeroy, 90 Mass. (8 Allen) 480, 484–85 (1864). And complying with the
laws of war was a complete defense to a common law tort suit. See, e.g., Terrill v. Rankin,
65 Ky. (2 Bush) 453, 458 (1867).
30. For a helpful and succinct overview, see Chimène I. Keitner, Rights Beyond Borders,
36 YALE J. INT’L L. 55, 60–61 (2011).
31. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) (“[T]he Government’s
obligation of protection is correlative with the duty of loyal support inherent in the citizen’s
allegiance . . . .”); id. at 769 (“[O]ur law does not abolish inherent distinctions recognized
throughout the civilized world between citizens and aliens, nor between aliens of friendly
and of enemy allegiance, nor between resident enemy aliens who have submitted themselves
to our laws and nonresident enemy aliens who at all times have remained with, and adhered
to, enemy governments.” (footnote omitted)); Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 74 (1942) (“A
lawful residence implies protection, and a capacity to sue and be sued.” (quoting Clarke v.
Morey, 10 Johns. 69, 72 (N.Y. 1813))).
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the Constitution, laws, and institutions of the United States, while
noncitizens outside the country and military enemies wherever located are
excluded from protection? Many legal academics and human rights
activists consider some of the traditional domain rules that limited
protections for noncitizens and military enemies to be undesirable and even
disreputable. They are not wrong that some outdated or even troubling
reasons have been advanced to justify using territorial location, enemy
status, or citizenship to determine whether a person has constitutional
protections. And they are not wrong that the U.S. government is more
likely to act excessively harshly when it acts on those outside the domain of
protection. But there are some good reasons as well for the traditional rules
about domain.
First, this Part addresses the less controversial issue: the reasons why we
might want to give both citizens and noncitizens inside the United States
very similar kinds of civil liberties protections. Second, I examine the
possible justifications for treating noncitizens outside the United States and
military enemies as outside the protection of the Constitution. For any
specific constitutional right or structural protection for individual liberty,
there could be a unique and complex calculus about whether it makes sense
to reserve liberties for some people, places, and contexts, but not others.
But this Part makes general observations rather than focusing on specific
instances.
A. U.S. Territory As a Zone of Liberty Irrespective of Citizenship
The traditional domain rule that gave robust protection to aliens living or
traveling within the United States had a number of conceptual foundations
and justifications. This view that alien residents or visitors are under the
protection of the sovereign’s municipal laws, so long as they are within the
country, had ancient roots in the Hebrew Bible,32 and can be seen in
foundational documents like the Magna Carta.33 As it developed in
England, the idea was fundamentally feudal, as seen in the older
terminology used to describe it, which stressed a reciprocal relationship
between protection and allegiance. One was said to owe personal
allegiance to one’s lord or monarch, and in exchange for that allegiance and
service, received protection.34 Thus, allegiance and, hence, protection were
intimately tied to the land, that is, to geography.

32. See, e.g., Leviticus 24:22 (“Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger,
as for one of your own country: for I am the LORD your God.”); Numbers 15:16 (“One law
and one manner shall be for you, and for the stranger that sojourneth with you.”);
Deuteronomy 24:17–18 (“Thou shalt not pervert the judgment of the stranger. . . . But thou
shalt remember that thou wast a bondman in Egypt, and the LORD thy God redeemed thee
thence: therefore I command thee to do this thing.”); Zechariah 7:9–10 (“Thus speaketh the
LORD of hosts, saying, Execute true judgment, and shew mercy and compassions every man
to his brother: And oppress not the widow, nor the fatherless, the stranger, nor the
poor . . . .”).
33. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69.
34. See KETTNER, supra note 7, at 13–61.
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Over time, as the lord-subject relationship was depersonalized and
became one between and among subjects and their government, an element
of contract was understood to inform the protection-allegiance
framework.35 In this social contract, an individual and the government
were understood to have reciprocal rights and duties. The individual had a
duty of allegiance, which included obeying the law and maintaining fidelity
to one’s home state, and, at some times and for some people, rendering
actual services such as military duty. The government had the reciprocal
obligation of protection for the people owing allegiance. This included not
only providing domestic law and institutions (paradigmatically courts) to
protect rights, but also things such as intervening diplomatically, or perhaps
even militarily, to protect citizens when mistreated abroad.
Although aliens were not thought to be part of any organic social
contract, the protection-allegiance framework nevertheless provided robust
protections for them when they were living or peacefully traveling within
the country. They owed a “temporary allegiance,” and, hence, were within
protection during their time there.36 Emerging out of feudal times, treating
aliens within the country equitably and generously was a refrain of many
natural lawyers and other theorists,37 and was an emerging norm of the law
of nations in the eighteenth century.38 It found expression in early bilateral
treaties of the United States39 and official U.S. government policy.40
Supreme Court opinions tend to give noninstrumental reasons explaining
the constitutional protections for noncitizens in the United States. One set
of reasons is formal, based on a constitutional text which only infrequently
limits rights by citizenship or location.41 The Court also suggested that
“general international law” required the United States to give legal
protections to noncitizens residing within the sovereign territory—unless

35. Id. at 246–47.
36. See Kent, supra note 22, at 176–91.
37. See, e.g., 3 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF
NATURAL LAW 145–48 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758).
38. See 3 G.F. VON MARTENS, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, FOUNDED ON
THE TREATIES AND CUSTOMS OF THE MODERN NATIONS OF EUROPE 83 (William Cobbett
trans., London, Cobbett & Morgan 1802) (1795); 8 id. at 273.
39. See Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-United Mexican States, arts.
XIV–XV, Apr. 5, 1832, 8 Stat. 410; Treaty of Friendship, Limits and Navigation, U.S.Spain, art. XX, Oct. 27, 1795, 8 Stat. 138; Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Prussia, art.
II, July 9–Sept. 10, 1785, 8 Stat. 84; Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Swed., art. XVII,
Apr. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 60; Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Neth., art. VIII, Oct. 8, 1782,
8 Stat. 32.
40. See Judicial Privileges of Foreigners, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 192, 193 (1816); Reprisals, 1
Op. Att’y Gen. 30, 32 (1793).
41. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (holding that the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments protected all within U.S. territory, including resident aliens, by
applying the reasoning of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886), which found that
the “provisions [of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment] are universal in their
application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences
of race, of color, or nationality”).
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some positive law directed otherwise.42 Another kind of noninstrumental
justification offered by the Court several times is that “[t]he alien [is]
accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his
identity with our society,”43 by residing here and developing what the Court
called “significant voluntary connection[s].”44 This approach views
constitutional protection as a claim against the government that comes from
membership in a community—a kind of social contract idea tied to a
particular community and the government it created.45
There are also many instrumental reasons to treat both stranger and
citizen equally and fairly within the home country. It promotes peace by
reducing international friction. Mistreating foreign nationals or denying
them justice was a frequent source of strife and even a justifiable cause of
war prior to the twentieth century.46 This fact was cited during the
Constitution’s ratification debates as a reason to empower a new federal
government to protect foreigners.47 Equitable treatment of foreigners in the
United States was thought to promote commerce and other forms of trade
and exchange, as well as immigration, which was a source of power for the
state.48
Constitutional rights and equitable treatment for foreigners in the United
States probably helped maintain law and order and encourage productive
behavior by immigrants. Persons who felt secure within the protections of
the law would be more likely to obey the law and invest positively in the
future.
It also helped protect liberty for U.S. citizens. The goal was to build a
government that was not tyrannical, but that respected rights and acted
through ordinary legal processes. If our legal regime had empowered state
institutions to act harshly and without constitutional restraint against
internal aliens, that objective would be undermined. Keeping U.S. territory
as a zone of civil liberty for both citizens and noncitizens has been an
explicit goal of the designers of our national security institutions, laws, and
practices. I think it rests in part on the idea that, to protect the liberty of
citizens here, we must protect the liberty of everyone here in the United
States by structuring and restraining the government from grossly
42. Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47, 61–62 (1892) (“By general international
law, foreigners who have become domiciled in a country other than their own acquire rights
and must discharge duties in many respects the same as possessed by and imposed upon the
citizens of that country; and no restriction on the footing upon which such person stand by
reason of their domicile of choice, or commercial domicile, is to be presumed.”).
43. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990) (quoting Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950)).
44. Id. at 271.
45. NEUMAN, supra note 8, at 54–55.
46. 3 DE VATTEL, supra note 37, at 230–31.
47. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).
48. See Kent, supra note 8, at 504 (“The strong desire of many eighteenth-century
Americans to stimulate economic development and to populate their new country by
encouraging immigration, would likely have contributed to the understanding that aliens
within the country should be under the protection of the laws, as would the American social
values of egalitarianism, opportunity, and hospitality to strangers.” (footnotes omitted)).

2014]

CITIZENSHIP AND PROTECTION

2127

mistreating anyone.49 It is often very difficult or impossible, ex ante, for
government actors engaged in coercion to determine whether someone is a
citizen or noncitizen. A government officer stopping someone on the street
for purposes of interrogation or arrest likely won’t know in advance the
target’s citizenship. So it is preferable that U.S. law require the government
to treat everyone with equal dignity and rights. Serious government
coercion, especially military or covert action, often spills over and affects
much more than just the intended target. Thus, it is preferable to strictly
limit all domestic uses of coercion of those kinds. And as David Cole has
argued, if U.S. law empowers the government to act harshly against
noncitizens, that precedent can later be used to justify application of those
same measures to citizens.50
It has not been universally agreed upon that all persons within sovereign
U.S. territory during peacetime were within the protection of the laws and
courts. During the Founding era, some hard-line Federalists adopted
arguments that Professor Neuman correctly describes as “nativist” and
“exclusionary,” arguing that aliens were not “parties” to the “compact” of
the Constitution and so were not protected by it.51 In part, the justification
was that republican government required specific habits of mind and
character that aliens might not possess; there were also fears that
noncitizens might corrupt or radicalize the U.S. citizenry if they were made
fully part of the people of the United States.52 The Federalists lost this
argument, however.
In our history, the major exception to the practice of granting equal or
nearly equal protection for civil liberties to all within U.S. sovereign
territory during peacetime occurred when the United States became a
colonial power in 1898.53 As part of the peace treaty with Spain, Puerto
Rico and the Philippines became U.S. territories.54 In a series of decisions
known as the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court repeatedly held that certain
constitutional guarantees did not extend to these islands, notwithstanding
that they were de jure U.S. territory and the war had ended.55 The Court
generally did not distinguish between U.S. citizens and noncitizens in these

49. See generally NEUMAN, supra note 8, at 57–59.
50. See, e.g., David Cole, Against Citizenship As a Predicate for Basic Rights, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2544 (2007).
51. NEUMAN, supra note 8, at 54–56.
52. Id. at 56.
53. As noted in the Introduction, I am speaking about issues that can be said to involve
foreign relations or national security, and am therefore not speaking about slavery, women’s
rights, or other domestic issues.
54. Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain
(Treaty of Paris), U.S.-Spain, arts. II–III, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, 1755–56.
55. See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (criminal jury trial and Seventh
Amendment civil jury guarantee); Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905) (Double
Jeopardy Clause); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (jury trial guarantees of Article
III and Sixth Amendment); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (Uniform Duties
Clause of Article I).
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cases.56 The Court came to say that only “fundamental” constitutional
guarantees were applicable.57 The justifications for this departure from
traditional constitutional practice ranged from the frankly racist to the
practical.58 The various justifications for according lesser constitutional
protections to U.S. citizens and others resident in island territories like
Puerto Rico are certainly not convincing today, if they ever were. To my
mind, they provide no basis to question the correctness of our traditional
constitutional practice of providing robust constitutional protections to all
persons in U.S. territory during peacetime, irrespective of citizenship.
Our constitutional tradition of only rarely making distinctions between
citizens and noncitizens with regard to civil liberties within the United
States is so longstanding and supported by such strong policy justifications
that it would be appropriate, in my view, to say that by the accumulation of
judicial and political precedent we have implicitly adopted a rebuttable
presumption that noncitizens peacefully in the United States can claim the
same constitutional protections for civil liberties as citizens. Of course that
presumption would be rebutted in some immigration contexts because the
United States must retain the ability to decide which noncitizens are entitled
to remain here. But in most contexts, I think it would and should be
difficult to find persuasive reasons to justify differential treatment.59
B. War and Extraterritorial Location As Limits on Protection
There are probably few today who would disagree that citizens and
noncitizens should have very similar levels of constitutional protections
when they are in the United States peacefully. The controversial questions
concern extraterritorial activities and wartime. As discussed above, the
protection of noncitizens under the Constitution was historically thought to
stop at the border, and military enemies wherever located were understood
to lack protection by the Constitution, laws, and courts. The case of
56. See, e.g., Balzac, 258 U.S. at 309 (“The citizen of the United states living in Porto
Rico cannot there enjoy a right of trial by jury under the federal Constitution, any more than
the Porto Rican. It is locality that is determinative of the application of the Constitution, in
such matters as judicial procedure, and not the status of the people who live in it.”). For a
discussion and analysis of the Insular Cases, see generally Kent, Insular Cases, supra note
12.
57. See, e.g., Balzac, 258 U.S. at 305, 309.
58. See, e.g., id. at 310 (suggesting that jury trials were inappropriate in Puerto Rico in
part because the Spanish civil law system had been so long entrenched there).
In reality, residents of the island territories had greater civil liberties protections than
these Court decisions suggest, because by executive order and later by statute, the U.S.
government imposed on itself almost all of the constitutional limitations in favor of
individual rights that applied against federal government in the United States. See, e.g.,
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 111–23 (1904) (describing executive and
congressional actions to bring U.S. constitutional principles to the Philippines).
59. David Cole has succinctly rebutted some common but very unconvincing arguments
against extending equal rights to noncitizens within the United States, such as their potential
disloyalty, their status as guests rather than persons entitled to be here, the notions that what
they seek are privileges rather than rights as such, and the claim that granting equal rights
will reduce incentives to naturalize. See David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the
Same Constitutional Rights As Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 384–88 (2003).
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extraterritorial rights for U.S. citizens is complex and muddled,60 and I will
largely table it because most extraterritorial U.S. government activities
impact noncitizens. What might justify limiting the constitutional and other
protections for noncitizens to peacetime and the borders of U.S. sovereign
territory?
In recent decades, most academic commentary about the domain of the
Constitution has been strongly opposed to linking rights to either
citizenship or the territory of the United States. It has supported judicial
enforcement of constitutional norms for all people in all or most places and
contexts, including at U.S. borders, outside the United States, and perhaps
even during armed conflicts. Professor Neuman’s work has been the most
influential attempt to categorize different approaches to determining the
personal, territorial, and contextual domain of the Constitution. As he
recognizes, much modern academic commentary strongly supports a
“universalist” view of the Constitution’s domain, an approach that
“require[s] that constitutional provisions that create rights with no express
limitations as to the persons or places covered should be interpreted as
applicable to every person and at every place.”61 Given the normative
preference of many academics for universalism—or if not, universalism,
then at least a domain of protection much more expansive than provided
under traditional rules—it is not surprising that the old doctrines and
practices that limited the Constitution’s reach because of war, territorial
location, domicile, or citizenship have come under harsh academic
criticism.
In influential accounts, some scholars emphasize that geographic limits
on the Constitution’s protections reflect abandoned notions of strict
territorial jurisdiction in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century international
law and conflicts of laws.62 Other accounts assert that limits on the
Constitution’s domain in the foreign affairs area arose from unsavory and
even racist case law justifying the exertion of plenary governmental control
over American Indians, immigrants, and nonwhite inhabitants of America’s
colonial empire.63 Still others trace the limited domain of the Constitution
in the war, foreign affairs, and imperialism contexts in part to an unhealthy
desire by the U.S. government for maximum flexibility to assert its
power.64 David Cole critiques constitutional rules and counterterrorism
policies that draw distinctions between citizens and noncitizens as a new

60. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text.
61. NEUMAN, supra note 8, at 5; see also id. at 6 (“[T]he universalist approach has
significant support among modern commentators . . . .”).
62. Id. at 7, 83, 89, 91; see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law and
the Constitution Abroad, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 225, 229 (2010) (“Traditional doctrines
regarding the geographic scope of U.S. constitutional protections derive from nineteenthcentury international law principles of jurisdiction, which largely limited the lawful
jurisdiction of a sovereign state to its geographic territory.”).
63. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens,
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81
TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002).
64. See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? 86 (2009).
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kind of “political repression” that bears some similarities to McCarthyite
paranoia about subversive foreign influence.65 And he worries that
excessive fear has often driven the United States to act more harshly toward
noncitizens, who are convenient targets due to their inability to defend
themselves politically because of a lack of representation.66 Since
September 11, 2001, a vast array of commentators and activists have called
for U.S. military policies such as overseas detention, interrogation,
surveillance, and drone strikes aimed at noncitizens to be newly subject to
judicial review and constitutional limitation, rather than left in the
discretionary control of the political branches.
These commentators believe that the traditional underpinnings and
justifications of domain limits along the axes of geography, citizenship, and
war are no longer tenable and that the domain of the Constitution and legal
protection more generally should be significantly expanded.67 Although
these critical accounts make some important points, they are incomplete for
not fully examining either the historical roots of the limitations on domain,
including the crucial allegiance-protection framework, or whether there are
any persuasive reasons why the domain of protection should be limited by
geography, war, and citizenship.
In my view, there are some plausible reasons to think that traditional
limits on domain are justifiable. Internally, government has the capacity
and duty to create an ordered society of liberty. It has pervasive contact
with the populace. It can legislate to structure the government, economy,
and society. It has many levers of power and control—criminal law, tax
law, civil regulation, a monopoly on the use of force, and, in particular, use
of military force. Thus, at home, the government is all powerful and has
duties to allow human flourishing. In these circumstances, the U.S.
constitutional tradition has thought it critical to provide protection against
government overreaching to both citizens and aliens. This ensures that the
great power of the government is exercised responsibly and with due regard
to the interests of affected individuals.
Externally, the U.S. government has much less power, much less contact
with the people, and much less practical ability to monitor, control, and
coerce. As a result, it is much harder to predict, preempt, or deter externally
based, as opposed to domestic, threats. As Madison asked in The Federalist
No. 41, in discussing whether the Constitution should prohibit a standing
army:
With what colour of propriety could the force necessary for defence [of
the United States] be limited by those who cannot limit the force of
offence? If a Federal Constitution could chain the ambition or set bounds
to the exertions of all other nations: then indeed it might prudently chain
the discretion of its own Government, and set bounds to the exertions for
65. David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2003).
66. Cole, supra note 50, at 2542–44.
67. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2523
(2005).
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its own safety. How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely
prohibited, unless we could prohibit, in like manner, the preparations and
establishments of every hostile nation?68

Madison’s point also applies to the question of whether the external,
defensive powers of the federal government should be limited by robust
individual-rights guarantees.
When the U.S. government does exercise power externally, it can
generally act only episodically, usually either with consent and to some
extent under the direction of the foreign state, or hostilely. Both of these
situations—consent from the host state or hostile action, which will almost
always be opposed by the territorial state—impose real limits on what the
U.S. government can do.
The purposes of government action are different too. Externally, the U.S.
government is generally not creating civic order, but engaging in very
different functions like intelligence gathering, war, and diplomacy and very
targeted law enforcement against particular high-importance offenders.
As Justice Joseph Story said, “in a republic” such as the United States,
governmental “institutions are essentially founded on the basis of peace.”69
The individual rights in the U.S. Constitution were designed for the
paradigm case of a government ordering everyday, peacetime affairs within
its sovereign territory. Recall that, at the Founding, the Constitution was
not understood to protect either noncitizens outside the United States or
military enemies wherever located. A number of the individual rights in the
Constitution make absolutely no sense to think of as applicable to
extraterritorial activity or to war or other contested assertions of power—for
instance, the Second and Third Amendments. Given its purposes, it is
similarly hard to understand how the First Amendment could possibly be
thought applicable to nonsovereign activity of the U.S. government abroad,
such as military action or intelligence work. Many other provisions of the
Bill of Rights, such as most of the Fifth and all of the Fourth, Sixth, and
Seventh Amendments, as well as the Suspension Clause, presuppose the
paradigm case of domestic governance operating through the civil court
system. Applying these very stringent rules designed for domestic
peacetime situations of political, civil, and economic liberty to
extraterritorial activities—be it war, intelligence gathering, covert action,
postconflict reconstruction and nation building—could be exceedingly
awkward and would limit too greatly the legitimate national security
powers of the state.
One might respond that the courts could just balance and limit any
constitutional right that seemed to be a poor fit for an extraterritorial or
national security context and that this would be better than having a
categorical rule stopping the Constitution at the water’s edge. Maybe.
Freedom for the judiciary to tailor rights would introduce a massive amount
68. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison).
69. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
§ 1166 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).
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of judicial subjectivity, requiring the courts to make complex factual
assessments and predictions about which rights would be workable to
observe in which extraterritorial national security settings, untethered from
any textual guidance. Nothing about the composition, structure, or
information-gathering ability of the federal judiciary gives me a great deal
of confidence that it is suited for such a difficult task. Constitutionalizing
our extraterritorial national security policy also strikes me as potentially
problematic because it would rigidly fix rules rather than allow the U.S.
government to act quickly, flexibly, and nimbly. And it would, as Madison
warned, unilaterally hamstring the United States while leaving our
adversaries free to act as they wish.
Limiting external national security activities with international law, U.S.
statutes, executive orders, and discretionary policy decisions based on
concerns about reciprocity, legitimacy, and the like provides a good deal of
protection to noncitizens, while also giving desirable flexibility to the U.S.
government. It is not just policy flexibility that the U.S. government gets
from the traditional domain rules. Clear, categorical rules also reduce
decision costs and allow decisionmakers to plan with some certainty about
the legal rules by which their conduct will be governed.70 And finally, if
rights protections for noncitizens or military enemies can be granted or
withheld by the political branches—via treaties, statutes, or policy
decisions—U.S. policymakers have some bargaining power to secure
greater protections for the rights of Americans.71
Since the Constitution has been interpreted to apply extraterritorially for
the benefit of U.S. citizens, it is sometimes said to be arbitrary and
unjustifiable to fail to extend that protection to noncitizens.72 This seems
overly simplistic. Questions of scale and the specifics of each location are
quite significant. There is no reliable count of the number of U.S. citizens
residing abroad, but a recent estimate puts it around 6 million.73 While the
U.S. government and legal system may be able to extend the extraordinary
protections of the U.S. Constitution and courts to citizens abroad in the
relatively few instances where that might arise, it would be an entirely
different matter to hold those protections available to the over 6.5 billion
non-U.S. citizens living outside the United States.
There are other unconvincing arguments for extending constitutional
protections and judicial review to noncitizens abroad is. One asserts that,
70. See Eric A. Posner, Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial
Cosmopolitanism, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 28.
71. See id. at 43 (“Unilateral action by courts to grant unreciprocated benefits to
noncitizens simply weakens the bargaining power of their own government.”).
72. See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 67, at 2523.
73. See 6.32 Million Americans (Excluding Military) Live in 160-Plus Countries, ASS’N
AMERICANS RESIDENT OVERSEAS, http://www.aaro.org/about-aaro/6m-americans-abroad
(last visited Mar. 25, 2014). Most of those reside in Europe and North and South America.
See id. (estimating about 4.2 million U.S. citizen residents of those areas). East Asia, South
Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, where the United States has been more likely to act on its
own—without host government assistance or sometimes even consent—to protect national
security, have far fewer resident U.S. citizens.
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because all humans have equal dignity, as supposedly recognized by
international human rights law, our Constitution should be interpreted to
recognize this too.74 It is true that human rights law proceeds from fairly
universalist premises, but there is no easy analogy between constitutional
rights and international human rights. Many provisions of important human
rights instruments are limited to the jurisdiction of the signatory,75 rather
than imposing worldwide obligations. More importantly, many states
agreeing to international human rights instruments knew that they would
have discretion, as a matter of their domestic law, about how and to what
extent they would be enforced.76 So states may agree to greater rights on
paper because they know that those rights would mean less in practice.77 In
countries like the United States, the legislature has authority to override or
limit treaty provisions if it thinks the national interest requires that, but of
course the U.S. Constitution cannot be changed except by the Court or
formal amendment. Constitutionalization of extraterritorial actions by the
U.S. government would therefore introduce a great deal of rigidity and
constraint. Moreover, the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, frequently imposes much more exacting restrictions on the
government than human rights treaties do, such as in the area of criminal
procedure. In sum, arguments that the existence of universal-sounding
international human rights somehow suggest that U.S. constitutional rights
should be extended to noncitizens abroad have little real traction.
There are of course other arguments that have been or could be made in
favor of extending constitutional protections and judicial review to
noncitizens abroad. For example, there may be reputational and diplomatic
benefits associated with holding the U.S. government’s extraterritorial
treatment of noncitizens to the same very high standards we reserve for
persons within the United States.78 I do not aim to present a complete
ledger of the costs and benefits of increasing protection for noncitizens
abroad and military enemies. My aim is rather to help fill a gap in the
academic debate, which is largely one-sided in favor of a greatly expanded
74. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Guantanamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 263, 299,
300, 312, 314 (2004); Louis Henkin, The Constitution As Compact and As Conscience:
Individual Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 29 (1985); Jordan
J. Paust, An Introduction to and Commentary on Terrorism and the Law, 19 CONN. L. REV.
697, 723 (1987).
75. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
arts. III, VI, XIV, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S 195 (entered into force
Jan. 4, 1969); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. II, adopted and
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 1057 U.N.T.S. 407; Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment arts. II,
V, X, XII–XIII, XVI, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85,
114; Convention on the Rights of the Child art. II, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).
76. For instance, the U.S. Senate has given its advice and consent to ratification of
human rights treaties on the condition that they be non-self-executing.
77. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?,
111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002).
78. See, e.g., Galia Rivlin, Constitutions Beyond Borders: The Overlooked Practical
Aspects of the Extraterritorial Question, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 135, 135 (2012).
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domain of protection that sweeps away the traditional, categorical
limitations.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I offer some thoughts about the future regarding the two
major issues discussed: the traditions of providing robust legal protection
for all within U.S. territory regardless of citizenship but of withholding
constitutional protections from military enemies and from noncitizens
abroad.
If one is persuaded, as I am, that protecting the liberties of the people of
the United States from government overreaching requires giving
noncitizens present in the United States the same or very similar
constitutional protections, then there are a number of policies in the present
or recent past that deserve careful scrutiny. For example, laws like the
Arizona “show your papers” provision targeting illegal immigrants79 are
objectionable on these grounds if they increase the likelihood of racial or
ethnic profiling and harassment of U.S. citizens or lawfully present aliens.80
Although the Constitution as currently interpreted allows Congress and the
executive to make distinctions between people from different countries for
purposes of immigration law, the instrumental reasons for treating U.S.
territory as a zone of liberty irrespective of citizenship might suggest some
limits. For example, the widespread post-9/11 immigration round-ups
which targeted people by national origin—being nationals of Arab and/or
Muslim nations—probably made some U.S. citizens or lawful permanent
residents who shared the same origins feel less secure in their rights. David
Cole has frequently argued that burdens on the speech of immigrant
noncitizens poses risks to the First Amendment rights of citizens. These
concerns should inform the policy balance struck by the political branches,
and are also arguably relevant to constitutional interpretation by the courts
of the rights of noncitizens present in the United States.81 As I argue above,
our constitutional tradition might well support a rebuttable presumption that
civil liberties protections available for U.S. citizens in the United States
extend to noncitizens.
Turning now to the traditionally categorical barriers to constitutional
protection for military enemies and noncitizens abroad, I see a great
convergence occurring. Even though, as I suggested in Part II.B, there are
some sound reasons supporting these categorical limits on domain, they are
79. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2012) (requiring state officers to make a
“reasonable attempt . . . to determine the immigration status” of any person they stop, detain,
or arrest on some other legitimate basis if “reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an
alien and is unlawfully present in the United States”).
80. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012) (finding that the Arizona
provision was not preempted by congressional enactments, but suggesting that new legal
challenges could be brought in the future after the law’s implementation is examined).
81. See generally Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CALIF.
L. REV. 373 (2004) (arguing that U.S. citizens have important interests in the content of
much immigration law nominally directed at noncitizens and thus should have standing to
challenge it).
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increasingly being swept away. The importance of citizenship to protection
by the Constitution and courts is further decreasing, formal barriers to legal
protection and judicial review based on extraterritorial location and enemy
status are dissolving, and the dissolution of these categorical boundaries is
changing the design and operation of the U.S. national security state. Legal
rules and practices regarding protection of civil liberties are becoming more
uniform across the entire domain of U.S. government national security
activity. I plan to explore this convergence in future work.

